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Jeremy Raper is going FAR (Podcast #96)
Jeremy Raper return to the podcast to talk about his latest campaign at FAR. FAR is an extremely small company on an international exchange, so listeners should do their own work, but Jeremy thinks the company is in play and substantially undervalued.
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Transcript begins below
Andrew Walker: All right. Hello and welcome to Yet Another Value Podcast. I'm your host, Andrew Walker. And with me today, I'm excited to have the original guest of the podcast. The most frequent guest of the broadcast. My friend, Jeremy Raper. Jeremy, how's it going?
Jeremy Raper: Great, mate. What episode am I up to now, 6, 7, somewhere in there?
Andrew: You know, I was wondering this afternoon, I think it's six. It could be seven. I need to keep track. I'll start labeling the podcast. Like I keep track of what number of podcasts. Well, if everyone else podcast, then what Jeremy Raper's podcast. Just to keep your hand up[?].
Jeremy: Did you get any feedback saying that random Australian guy's been away too many times, stop getting him back?
Andrew: No. You're one of the most popular guests. I tweet out that you're coming on, and the inbox fills up and they say, "Hey, have him talk about every name in his book. Have him tell us what we should do with our life. You're a popular guy.
Jeremy: Good to hear. Well, I'm what can I say? I like to solve problems. That's what I do.
Andrew: Let me start this podcast the way do like every podcast. First, disclaimer, I remind everyone nothing on this podcast investing advice, probably particularly true today. I think Jeremy and I are going to talk about his latest activism play, but we also might talk about some other stocks. And Jeremy traffics in the E-liquid, the international, the unknown. So, just please consult a financial advisor. Do your own due diligence. The second way, I start every podcast is a pitch for you my guest but we already did the pitch six-time on the podcast. If that doesn't speak to you, I don't know what is.
So let's just dive right into it. You're running another activist campaign. I think the last time we had you on or maybe two times ago, was kind of your first activist campaign over at Hunter Douglas, which worked out. Seemingly, I'll let you kind of recount the full story, if you want to. But the contest you're running right now; not a contest, but the plays you're applying pressure is FAR Limited. The ticker is F-A-R (FAR), it trades in Australia. And all that all the way, I'll toss it over to you. What's going on with FAR?
Jeremy: Sure. Thanks very much. So, yes, okay. So I'll try and keep it as brief and as succinct, and up-to-date as possible, because this is quite has a long and interesting corporate history that's a company, but I'm not sure all of it is entirely relevant to what's going on today. But in a nutshell, FAR is as you mentioned Australian listed as Small-Cap Oil and Glass Explorer. And when I say small-cap, it is a small-cap. I think the market cap today is about 65 million Aussie.
Jeremy: They have just over 100 million net assets. As I mentioned, a very interesting in toward a history of exploration, mostly in West Africa. Mostly with poor success. However, they did kind of strike a huge find in Senegal, a very long time ago. Over a decade ago, they found the original oil field that would later become the Sangomar S-A-N-G-O-M-A-R. Sangomar development project, which is frankly, one of the world's great oil discoveries in recent years and has been progressively advanced from discovery to development, to probably first oil production in 2023.
Unfortunately, now under different ownership will talk about that. But essentially, I mean, just by way of context, this is a very small company. There are lots of companies like this in Australia. I mean, it's kind of like Canada. There are kind of a dime and dozen junior, junkie, small-cap oil, and gas or mining exploration plays[?] with varying degrees of management quality and varying degrees of exploration assets.
What makes FAR interesting today is that, unlike say, 9 out of 10 of those other types of plays listeners Australian probably most in Canada too. You have something real and tangible on the balance sheet. And that is a whole bunch of cash and extremely valuable deep in the money earning out from Woodside.
Woodside being a very large Aussie operator, the largest oil and gas producer in Australia, a 30 billion-dollar company. Which bought the Sangomar assets from FAR and it's the operator today and is essentially going to pay them in earn-out if production comes online and oil prices stay at certain levels over the next few years. We'll talk about that.
But just to frame the overall valuation case first, was I think this is important. So basically, net cash on the balance sheet today, net of all remaining obligations and basically with an accrual for costs in 2022 and probably longer than that. I think is about 45 to 50 censorship.
Jeremy: Okay. Then the value of the...
Andrew: Hey, Jeremy, I'll stop you there. As we speak now, we can talk about how this FAR[?] first got here because it's interesting in its own right. But as we speak, the stock is around 65, 66 cents Aussie. So when you say 45 to 50%, it's not the entire share price, but it is a lot of the share price just to give you a little background[?].
Jeremy: Exactly. The stock price today is 66 cents Aussie, 45 cents-ish 45 to 50 cents, depending on your burned down assumptions on what happens with the corporate overhead and other things like that. Is it cap-backed by cash? And then you have this Woodside earn-out. Now, the Woodside earn-out is up to 55 million U.S. dollars. It's a contingent payment, right?
So it's up to 55 million U.S. dollars total based upon FAR's share of run reproduction. Once the Sangomar assets reach the first production, which is slated to be in mid-2023. So call it a year from today, maybe slightly longer than a year from today. And essentially what that means is you look at Forex original stake in the Sangomar assets before they sold Woodside, which was 13.7%.
Then you look at what Woodside is saying, phase one production will be which they're saying up to 100,000 barrels of oil equivalent a day. Then, you calculate the value that 13.7 percent, let's say a hundred thousand barrels a day, multiplied by the annual production, multiplied by the excess value.
Andrew: I was told there wasn't going to be a lot of math here, Jeremy.
Jeremy: Sorry. I know. Let's just put it this way. It adds up to about 25, 26 million U.S. dollars a year based on the metrics that would side has disclosed in U.S. dollars from the first production. So for example, if you think the field comes online in mid-2023 then from mid-2023 through mid-2024 assuming they produce around a hundred thousand barrels a day, FAR would be entitled to about 25 million dollars in arrear. So from mid-2024, they'd be getting 25 million. And then the year after that, they'd be getting another 26, 27 million.
So it is essentially from two full years of production they could get the full earn-out if oil prices stay where they are. So the maximum oils price trigger is $70 Brent, $70 Brent per barrel. And right now, the price of Brent is $100 a barrel. Importantly, the futures curve of Brent is not[?] of serving at all as a barrel for 2024 and last I checked, 2025. I need to check.
So the oil futures curve is in backwardation, basically, saying current prices are very high. They'll come down in the future as supply comes online or there's a shortage right now in the market, but my point is the oil futures curve is very liquid. You can easily hedge this out. If you wanted to make a bit on 2025 oil prices and "lock in those prices", you could do that today. So the earn-out is risky in the sense that or would say has to execute in RAM production.
But we're not talking about five years forward. We're talking about the near term, as it gets for a new potentially massive oil field. And that's evidenced by, I mean, the valuation of this thing before they were even thinking of selling it, right? So if you think about it, sorry. I should recap the valuation case before we talk about the event path because that frames everything else. So just take me at face value for now that the Woodside earn-out is worth some NPV number off that 55 million.
Jeremy: Because oil prices have deep in the money and because it's not too far and production, it's coming online in 12 to 15 months. And then, you have quite a long window of observation. You have three years from the first oil, up until the 2027 hard date. So, assuming even some incremental delays, you still have a three-year period to get your money from whenever you first of all start.
And if there are any periods of zero production or kind of hiccups, those don't count. So we can debate the NPV of that number. But if oil prices stay as they are, maybe it takes 2-3 years. Maybe it takes an extra year. You're probably going to get close to 55 million U.S.
Andrew: And how much of that for sure?
Jeremy: Yeah. So 55 million U.S. divided by the exchange rate today is 71, 72, it's as much as mid 70 cents per share gross. Now, of course, you have to NPV that because you wouldn't be entitled if you tried to cash it in today, you got an NPV. So then you have this argument about discount rates. I use a 10% discount rate. As I said, there's no price risk at the moment. There's very minimal price risk, but there is execution risk.
The 10% discount rate makes it worth about 55 cents a share. Slightly higher actually, maybe I got like 57 cents a share, some of that. The company... Yeah.
Andrew: At this point, no. Go ahead.
Jeremy: I was going to say, the company is fighting off a takeover bid at the moment, and in their documentation, they said it was worth, I think 50, 55, 50, a very similar number because there are third-party values or came up with a very similar discount rate. It was a 9.5 to 9 to 10% discount rate they got to as well. And that's a bit of fudge. I mean not a swag type math, but there's a way of estimation in these things.
But Woodside is, as I said, a premium operator, no note, no credit risk. Completely the best quality counterparty you could have, equivalent to BHP or whatever. Near-term production, they're the operator of the asset, huge financial commitment to developing this asset. As I said, this is a multi-billion dollar project, right?
Before this project was sold down by FAR, they were saying their NPV 10 of their own 14% stake back in mid-2019 when they did the original financing for the development of the field, there are 13% required funding cash call. They said the NPV 10 at the time was 540 million U.S. dollars for 13%. And that was with crude Brent at 60, 65 dollars a barrel.
Jeremy: So my point is this is not some hundred-million-dollar project. At today's oil prices, this is at least a 10 billion dollar project. To Woodside, this is a huge value creation opportunity. And the earn-out to Woodside is totally and utterly immaterial. Like there's no risk that they would slow play this project because they don't want to pay 550 million dollars. I mean, this is a...
Andrew: And people who listen to the podcast for a long time, we'll remember the Bristol-Myers CVRs where they managed to slowly climb. There's been some interest in court filings there. But yeah, like if it's a 9 billion dollar liability slow play it. If it's a 55 million dollar liability for a 10 billion dollar asset, you're probably not going to slow play. Especially it's not like if they delayed by a month, they're going to get out of it, right? There's this huge window of time. So you might as well just get that thing producing.
Jeremy: That's exactly right. They couldn't get out of it even if they slow-played it by a year or two. I mean you may as well just try to maximize value. And again, we're only talking Phase 1, right? This is meant to be part of a larger system in production that should not stop at 100,000 barrels a day. It should continue to grow through investment from there. So, for Woodside I mean, we can talk about what happened and how they even came to this asset. But essentially, they are coming out well ahead.
Andrew: So we've got 45 cents per share in cash, NPV 55 cents -ish of the earn-out here. So, I mean, right there were at a dollar per-share value. Anything else we need to consider when we're valuing this thing?
Jeremy: Sure. So that's a dollar right there. I mean, in my numbers, I was slightly north of a dollar more like a dollar 6.7, but whatever. Call it a dollar, that's what the company said. And then, they have all their hodgepodge of remaining oil drilling licenses. And so, look, I don't accord much value currently to those just because they did drill on some of the wells in The Gambia. The Gambia is right next to Senegal in West Africa. All their assets are in this West African pocket Senegal The Gambia Guinea-Bissau.
But anyway, they had a massive failure of one of their exploration wells. It was a complete disaster in their Gambier assets that they had spent 27, 28 million U.S. dollars on. So think about that, this company at that time it even a sub 100 million market cap company spending 28, 30 million U.S. dollars on one single exploration, which was delivered over budget by 10 million U.S. dollars.
Anyway, that was a failure and didn't find any commercial movable oil. Although they did say, they found hydrocarbons, great. The point is, they have that, that's their 50% share. They're also the operator. The other 50% is owned by Petronas, which is Malaysia's state-owned oil company.
And then, they have some other blocks of potential interest in Guinea-Bissau, which haven't been drilled in many years where their partner is a small Norwegian company called PetroNor that also doesn't have the money to drill those wells. And then, they have one tiny Australian asset. There's essentially worthless. So look, I mean...
Andrew: Let's put them all together. Just kind of bundle all those up. What do you think there's a roughly where[?]?
Jeremy: In my model at the moment, nothing.
Andrew: Nothing. Okay.
Andrew: So dollar per share a value, current share price about 65 cents. And then there's probably some other optionality in there.
Jeremy: Yeah, there's optionality. Right? I have nothing in it now, but there could be optionality that is very valuable to a large long-term investing state oil champion like Petronas that frankly, we as small shareholders in a company like FAR should not be valuing but Petronas may well be interested in owning these huge potential results[?].
So, for example, let's forget about Guinea-Bissau. And frankly, I don't think that's worth very much either. It's in a much more difficult geography. Guinea-Bissau had a coup attempt earlier this year. He's had three or four coups in the last 12 years. And apparently, an exploration well was meant to be drilled there as FAR back as 2015, '16, they didn't drill anything. So they're also not an operator. FAR is not an operator there.
So basically, they've already stated, they're trying to farm down their interest there. So, that farm down means, accepting a lower interest in the upside from development in return for, I guess not having to pay for the exploration well, right?
If we just focus on The Gambia, which before this recent disaster of a well, FAR was saying contain hundreds of millions potentially a billion barrels of oil in some of these discoveries, right? So huge, huge numbers and then I came up dry. Apparently, there's a path forward if you listen to FAR. I'm quite skeptical and dubious, especially given the history, but if that is so, why shouldn't we talk to Petronas and pinch potentially try to monetize at stake, right?
Let them take the development risk. And enjoy the upside and let us get out with some token amount to be determined, which would be de minimis for Petronas in, essentially, meaningless. But for FAR shareholders, currently with as I said, 50 million, 45, 50 million U.S. dollar market cap, a 20 million dollar check. Ten, 20 million dollars is a huge, huge kind of upside optionality. So, I mean, that's one of the platforms of my approach which I intend to pursue, we can talk about that.
But to summarize the evaluation case, 45 to 50 cents of net cash was unaffected. Call at 55 cents of NPV in the Woodside earn-out. And then, maybe something worth another 20, 30 cents if things break our way. But the key point is, this is an unaffected value. Unaffected meaning without core financial engineering. And the point is, the company is sitting on today, 50 cents of cash with the stock trading at 65 cents, okay.
And the company says, our shares are worth at least a dollar share, and the market it's been very liquid, stocks up a bit. But I think 20, 25 percent of the company has traded between 45 cents and 65 cents in the last month. Instead of spending this excess cash on further drilling adventures, a key part of my platform is to do something FAR more creative for shareholders and that is tender to retire a huge amount of stock.
Something close to the current price because yeah, it's a dollar per share if we leave things as is and just proceed to a wind-down. But if we actually retire a bunch of the flow, let's say, 75, 80, 85 cents, you can add another 20, 25, 30%. You're upside just through Efficient Capital Management. So all of a sudden, I'll let you speak in a minute.
But all of a sudden instead of getting a dollar value, we're getting a dollar 30 of value simply through efficient capital allocation. Like no exploration risk. No aggressive kind of Capex, no kind of operational risk at all. Simply through astute management. And so, that's something that is kind of a sine qua non of my investment thesis, and my kind of activist platform is what are we doing here? We should be doing a massive Dutch tender at its lowest prices possible. This is like ripe for the picking. Anyway, you had a number of questions.
Andrew: Now, look I think you did a great job laying out the numbers there. But one of the things is you said the surge that there are a lot of stocks, a lot of oil and gas, explorers. A lot of Biotech companies are trading below cash or something, right? You're trading way below hard asset value. The issue is, the market is putting a chance that the company is just never going to return that cash to shareholders. They're just going to keep drilling. Keep drilling into all the cash is gone.
I want to talk about what attracted you to the situation, and then talk about why. I think you published, I can't remember. It was a news article or your letter but you said, "Hey, I own about 1.5 percent of this company and I'm pushing for change here." So maybe we can start with the situation and then go, you pretty much already laid out your platform. Buyback shares when they're undervalued, and milk this thing.
Jeremy: Sure. Look, as you said, there are lots of cheap stocks in the world. I mean, this is kind of analogous to what I'm used to in Japan, right? You have very readily identifiable value, right. A bunch of cash, a bunch of securities are very deep in the money earn-out, right? And then, a bunch of people sitting in control. You come to the gate, you see behind the gate there's a bunch of treasure. The problem is, there's an ogre in front of the gate, and the ogre is not going to roll over and get out of the way, and that's the problem.
The problem is extracting the value. So, what's really interesting in this case is that, not only do I think it's possible to extract the value, I think it's almost inevitable. So let's look at the sequence of events. Okay. So this company was on the cusp of catapulting itself from being an unknown junior to being truly a large, mid-cap to larger Oil Company, purely based on its 14% stake in Sangomar.
As I said, on the books at NPV 10, 500 million-plus back with oil at 65, if they had, simply been able to maintain that stake and meet their funding calls, this would be a multi-billion dollar company today. So what happened? I'll try to keep it as brief as possible. But essentially, like all oil discoveries, it's generally a club affair, right? It's a JV with various ownership stakes.
Jeremy: FAR had been and always was a small and junior player. And then, they originally the large ownership stake was owned by ConocoPhillips. And another ownership stake was owned by Caron[?] Energy, the UK Energy company. Conoco decided to sell out their interest, I think it was in 2016. At the time, I think they were 35, 40% and they were also the operator. Okay, they sold that interest to Woodside as mentioned.
So Woodside went from zero came into the project. They saw the potential. They came in as a significant owner. If not, they weren't the largest in a bit of significant owner and operator. At the time FAR exercised, well, FAR claimed that move was against the JV agreement because they were not offered a preemption right on that cell. So in other words, it's pretty common in JVs that if you're an existing partner in the JV, if one of the JV partners wants to sell out, everyone else in the JV gets first, right to be on it[?].
Jeremy: Now at the time, FAR was still a rinky-dink tiny "shit goat" with no money. So they didn't have the money to even come close to bidding on the 35% stake in this field. Whatever Woodside paid, I'd have to look it up hundreds of millions of dollars. Nevertheless, the current managing director kicked up a huge fuss, tried to take Woodside to court. Went to arbitration. Arbitration extended for a very long period of time.
It extended so long that even though Woodside eventually did close on the transaction and won their case in arbitration, it precluded FAR from being able to raise enough capital expeditiously to fund their cash calls when the time came to make the payments because covid happened. Okay.
So while Covid happened, they had not finalized all their funding arrangements, FAR that is. And as a result, they were kind of caught short shrift, because they have done an equity financing of north[?] of 200 million Aussie. But that was going to be backed up with 350 million U.S. dollars of senior debt and potentially a junior piece of debt as well. Because their portion of the cash calls to get Sangomar to the first production were close to 500 million dollars.
Now, because of the ongoing arbitration, this is what I think, they had been unable to raise that debt financing well in advance, right? So, instead of raising that debt financing say, 18 months in advance of needing to pay the money. All of a sudden they were trying to raise that debt financing six months in advance of needing to pay the money or less, and then Covid happened.
Yes, Covid was a piece of bad luck, obviously, but that lack of astute management that decision to enter arbitration, the basis on which was questionable, and the financial consequences of wish you had no ability to finance anyway, was in effect to the downfall of this company. Because it forced them then during Covid to sell to Woodside at cents on the dollar.
Jeremy: Now, that in itself is another story, but essentially, that was the point. That's the key lesson or the key outcome here is. Because they couldn't meet their cash calls to keep their stake in the project they became a forced seller[?]. Once they were a forced seller, their kind of wolves are at the door. But even then, they made other mistakes. For example, they then engaged a further third party, an Indian oil company called ONGC, and decided to sell their stake.
Theoretically, with 540 million U.S. dollars at NPV 10 with 65 dollars a barrel, they decided to sell it for 110 million dollars. It was 45 million dollars plus reimbursement for some Capex, which ended up being a hundred the total price ended up being 126, but the headline number was 111 at the time. In other words, an 80% discount NPV 10. To be fair, this was in late 2020, basically, so oil prices had gone negative and then rebounded.
So all prices at the time, were 45, 50 dollars a barrel. So that's 165. So that NPV 10 number is basically, I'm saying that needs to be discounted fair. But again, why are you negotiating with the true third party who has no knowledge and no involvement in the JV? And when you know and as has been proven that Woodside has the right to come in and take any transaction you agree upon. Which is essentially what they did. So I got maybe you want to jump in here.
Andrew: Yeah, I think that was a good job. So I think at this point you've shown, hey this company was mismanaged historically. Maybe ethically, mismanaged. Though they obviously cope[?] with their arrangement[?]. But they're trading for less than they're pretty hard NPV for firm assets. Trading for less than firm assets is been mismanaged historically.
Let's fast-forward to kind of the news article that happened a few weeks ago that spikes your interest of the company.
Jeremy: Sure. So mismanagement historically, as you said, trading a big discount NPV forced to sell their core asset at cents on the dollars through self-inflicted mistakes. Let's say, and then I'm sorry, I need to include one further detail before the news article because it's quite important. As I mentioned, they raised a bunch of money from the equity markets in 2019 to fund their cash calls on Sangomar in two different transactions.
May 2019 and December 2019, they raised a total of 203 million Aussie. In both of those presentations, if you look at the investment decks, use of proceeds to get Sangomar for the first production. Yeah, they've had other corporate purposes. But essentially, this is infrastructure investment. This is not drilling. This is not wildcatting.
This is not exploration. This is to fund a share infrastructure costs to get a proven oil discovery to first production. In other words, their share of the FPSO. FPSO is a very expensive piece of the oil platform, essentially.
Jeremy: Yeah. That is extremely expensive. You need to build that. You need to build the oil pipeline that's going to tie into the FPSO from the actual discovery. These were very expensive and they have to fund their share of that. That was the stated use of proceeds for over 200 million dollars of invested capital.
Then all of a sudden, they're forced to sell that one asset for which that money was intended to be spent. And instead of returning said 200 million dollars, they decided we're not going to return anything and only after that existing shareholders cause a huge fuss. Do they decide to return 80 million dollars? Eighty out of the 203?
Complete and utter disregard for shareholders rights, frankly, because their money was raised based on infrastructure investment. Now, they're saying no we have a right to go and spend it as we say best fit on something completely different. I mean, it's essentially saying imagine if you were a horse and buggy manufacturer and you say we're going to expand our production of horse and buggy's.
And then a fire happens. The horse and buggy were house burns down. You take all that money and say, you know what, we're going to go invest in railroads. I mean, that's how different it is. Oil exploration versus infrastructure. I mean, that in itself was not just bad management, that was almost dishonest. Frankly, I'm happy to use that word, [unintelligible] almost dishonest.
Andrew: I'm just laughing because you know, you're preaching to the choir over here. I 100% agree with you. But at the same time, I mean, you've seen it a hundred times, right management. Management never wants to return the cash to shareholders once they've raised it.
Jeremy: You do see it a lot, especially in the junior oil and gas company. But again, going back to your point, what drew my interest in a situation is, this did promote some change. So, after the last AGM, so June 2021, July, 2021, the old board was turfed. They returned 80 million dollars, a number of the Legacy directors, but not the managing director. Miss Norman, who's been there for a decade. We'll talk about her shortly.
A number of the entire board got turfed. She remained. Two new directors came on board. So all the comments I've made, frankly, are not really related to those two new directors. They've only been there for seven months, let's say.
Jeremy: They're regarded to Legacy Management of the company. I want to make that very clear. But so there was some board renewal. They did return a million dollars, but nevertheless they kept going with this well. We want to continue drilling the prospects. For example, we have The Gambia, the one that just failed, that was drilled after the Sangomar asset sales. That's different.
But what drew me to the case, was about a month ago, an Aussie investment fund called Samuel Terry Asset Management, they call it STAM, just as an abbreviation. They bought 5% of the company, 4.9% and launched a takeover bid at 45 cents. Stock at the time was about 40. I mean it was almost a no premium bid. Maybe it was 5 cent per year.
And so, I had followed it peripherally on and off before then, but I wasn't really close to it. But you know, that bid made it quite clear what they wanted to do. Right? I mean, their cost basis was 40 cents. Essentially, 35 to 40 cents. And these are pure financial buyers. These aren't oil guys, but deep value guys based in Australia. They put in a bid for the whole company, saying, we want to get at least 50.1%, which is important. Meaning they want control. Once you have 50.1%, you have corporate and board control. You can essentially do whatever you want with the company.
Because that meant essentially they're going to try and wind the thing down. And basically buy it for 45 cents and get the dollar plus of value, as I kind of outline. So they're at 4.9%, they bid. That forces the company to come back and defend why that's inadequate bid. And as I mentioned, the company's putouts what's called a target statement where they say, look we're worth at least a dollar share.
Andrew: And we're taping this. What's today? Like I can't remember I did.
Jeremy: Today is the 25.
Andrew: We're taking this video the 24th, I think the target statement came out yesterday, February 23rd?
Jeremy: It came out either yesterday, or the day before, couple of days ago. But anyway, the Samuel Terry Asset Management bid seems quite unlikely to succeed. Just given where the stock price is, but I mean, in terms of platform, I think they're kind of analogous with what, again to be clear, I have no discussions with them and I am not a concert party of STAM.
But their platform for the forward look of the company is very similar. I imagine to what I would look to do and that essentially manages this thing in an orderly wind-down scenario and or strategic alternative scenario for the best value for shareholders.
And so, what really interested me was that because that led to a changing of the register, right? So 45 cent bid stocks are mainly trades 47, 50 cents. Obviously, that captures my interest. I bought all my shares in the 50s, but a huge amount of the float turned over a huge amount, 20% plus. And every day, the float continues to trade and my point to the company is look, you may have thought you had a mandate from shareholders for more drilling.
Post this standard[?] that is patently not clear because at least a quarter of the company is now essentially a vote for Capital return and maybe wind up. So your previous mandate has long been abrogated or relinquished. And shareholders simply want something new, they want a new direction. And so, I speak to a lot of shareholders in my position and I've acquired 1.5 percent of the company. I believe I've spoken with is in excess of 30% of the register.
And I'm going to try and speak with more. And I've had a lot of inbound since my letter went out as well. So maybe even 35% of the company would broadly support the kind of agenda that I'm setting forth. And that is essentially, an orderly windup of the company's affairs and return of all capital in the most expeditious form to shareholders. As I said, a very large tender would accomplish that but there are other avenues as well.
Negotiate with Woodside to crystallize the value of the earn-out in advance. And again, there's ways and mechanisms to do that. But essentially, what I'm offering is some kind of return of total value in it. Well, in excess of a dollar share, which again is the company promulgated number. But the company promulgated number is kind of interesting because that's a static theoretical number where they'd say, it's worth a dollar including 50 cents of cash.
But then, they want to continue spending that cash on drilling. So, it's kind of a habit both ways number. It's a have-your-cake- and-eat-it-too number. That's not really a dollar value unless we can get the value enough in shareholders pockets expeditiously, which is what I plan to do.
Andrew: So, let's just summarize what we've got at this point. So, the company has about a dollar per share and asset value plus a little bit of extra optionality. A couple of months ago, STAM comes and mobs in it. The stocks ready way under that value, probably because people think they're going to go drill a lot of dry wells, but trading way underneath it, STAM lobs in a 45 cent bid, which is, "Hey, we'll pay you for the cash on the balance sheet and we'll take everything else and then we'll liquidate this make a big profit ourselves."
The company rejects that, but stock trades through the offer. You come in buy up 1.5 percent and, correct me if I'm wrong, you are running a platform here. You're going activist, you're trying to replace board members and get your holders to vote on. Hey, let's get some board members, who will follow this pretty easy plan, right? Stocks at 66 start tendering at 72, tendering at 78, 82. Keep on tendering until you retire all the shares and then liquidate the proceeds to ever remains.
Jeremy: Essentially, yes. I should clarify, I have not put forth a board slate yet. So I just to be completely clear on where I stand today. Certainly, my go-forward plan is to engage more actively to take potential board control of this company through some shape or form. But again, just to kind of clarify the rules. So in Australia, you need to be a 5% shareholder to call an EGM an Extraordinary General Meeting.
Jeremy: At which meeting you could propose a variety of resolutions. For example, replacing directors. The directors are the ones who had replaced the managing director. So it's a bit of a two-step process. The first thing to do would be to propose your own slate of directors to achieve board control. And then, and that board would essentially replace the managing director.
Assuming the current board doesn't come around and see things my way, which that's a TBD. Frankly, again, all my comments on the historical mismanagement of the company relate to the current managing director and the legacy board, not the two new board members. Who as I said very new and obviously, I'm very happy and willing to work with them to achieve the best outcome for everyone involved.
The only thing is I just don't have anything concrete right now that I can disclose as with regards my own board slate, I can't say that I do.
Andrew: I shouldn't have said a word I say, but I guess that what you're saying is hey, I own 1.5 % of this company. I have talked to him for a group. But I've talked to another 30% of shareholders. And the board can go look at their stock price. It was 40 cents before the bid. It's at 65 cents now, like the stock was saying, hey, you're going to light a lot of cash on fire before this.
Now, the stock market, so you say, hey, we like that we might get our cashback and they're putting odds[?]. And you're just saying look, I'm going to pressure if the board wants to do what's right and return capital to shareholders, great, I don't have to do anything. If not, I'm prepared to go the next step is kind of where you're at, right?
Jeremy: That's totally right. I think that's a great way to put it. If the board is willing to play ball, we can have an amicable discussion. Of course, I welcome that first and foremost. But given some of the languages in their target statement, I think a prerequisite to that is going to be a change in managing director.
And so, maybe it's worth highlighting at least some of them. By the way, these are facts, these are not opinions. These are facts. But essentially, the managing director was appointed in 2011 in relation to FAR Energies merger with another small company called Flow Energy. Miss Norman was previously the managing director of that company. Since that time, she's been paying being paid gross compensation of 7.5 million Australian dollars. And delivered a negative 65% total shareholder return.
And today, she owns a couple of hundred thousand shares. And by the way, she did acquire a number of those shares in the open market, so it wasn't entirely all through grants and what have you[?]? But essentially my own holding at 1.5% is basically five times the entire boards holding today. So there's this basically, zero alignment between the board, the Legacy managing director and shareholders. And that's been the case for a very long time.
And as I said, 7.5 million gross compensation. I mean, to kind of put that in context, Miss Norman was getting paid regularly close to a million dollars a year. If you know, 78,900 churn[?] dollars a year. When the CEO of Woodside Australia is basically, were at the time was 25% of the CEO of Woodside's salary when the market Capex, one-one, ten thousandth or whatever it is. Right?
And so, there are a few other anecdotes that I'm you've all heard it before, but it only speaks to make the point. This company spends 500,000 dollars a year on office rents in Collins Street. Collins Street, Melbourne, by the way, I'm from Sydney. So I'm not taking a shot at Melbourne. Collins Street, Melbourne is kind of like Midtown Manhattan of Melbourne, white-collar bankers, lawyers territory.
I mean, this company has 85, 90 employees. It has no operating business. I mean, it's as a few, it has some businesses in West Africa where they're drilling for oil, but essentially has no operational revenue. No operating assets beyond a couple of drilling rigs which by the way, they don't own, they lease in, right? So for them to spend 500,000 dollars on and off head office rent for a company this size, is complete and utter, it's a joke frankly.
In 2020, the last disclosed year thus FAR, they spent a total of 2.7 million dollars on board compensation. Two point seven million dollars, again the board has shrunk since then. And again, those comments are to the previous board, not the current board, but the amount of corporate wastage and frittering of shareholders' assets when the board owns 0 shares have been frankly, objectionable.
Andrew: Let me follow up on that, because, we can talk lots of risks and stuff. But this is a pretty simple story, right? This is an activist situation with hard assets, for the most part. You can quibble if the NPVs 10% or 9% or 11%, but accident situation at the hard assets here, I think the biggest risk is, I've looked at micro caps for a long time and there have been several times right by, this is a micro-cap trading below cash. Let's just like, get the CEO on the phone, tell him to return capital and it's never that simple. Right?
And you've seen, I've seen micro caps literally burn the bridges like just light the entire company on fire trying to hold on to their jobs. Trying to keep the activist. And sometimes, it's like one of those pyrrhic victories where the activist come in and win, but they come in and win and the insiders have spent 50 million dollars on activist defense. And there's just kind of nothing left at the company anymore.
So I guess the easiest pushback or the biggest risk here is, obviously, we can talk Hunter Douglas and you had great success there. The shareholder base here is turned over a lot. So you would think shareholders are probably supportive of getting more money over less, right? But what happens if managers says, "Hey, we're making a lot of money. We're in control of the company. We're going to burn all this money on fire, trying to fight the activists off and keep the gravy train coming as long as we can."
Jeremy: All right, so I guess that's it. That's a very valid concern. Let me try and defang it as best I can. Firstly, as I mentioned, board renewal, this is not the board from elder, from the Legacy company. The two new board members essentially have no stake in maintaining the status quo, right? They've inherited a bad situation, sure. There are fees to be had, but if you look at the backgrounds of at least one if not both of those gentlemen, let's put it this way.
I believe they would be much more sympathetic to the argument I'm making to the Legacy board. So there's been some board renewal already. There are only three directors with two new and have been there for seven, eight months. And as you can imagine, you need a majority of the board to make it change at the MD position. So you can imagine how minimal board change is from here going forward could have a huge impact on the direction of the company. That's point one.
Point two, if actually read the target statement, they didn't come out right and say they agree with my agenda, of course, and there may be some elements within the board who want to maintain the gravy train. But if you look at what they've said about spending, they are doing a lot to kind of cut costs and wind down without saying it. So if you look at the two main exploration areas left Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. Guinea-Bissau, they said, look, we're trying to farm down our interests along with the operator, so that we don't have to bear the costs of drilling a well. Okay, that's point one.
And then the Gambia, they said, yeah, there's still a lot of oil, we're encouraged about the future prospects. Nevertheless, we are trying to farm down our interests, such that we get a free carry-on a well to be drilled in late 2023. And some cash component[?] back for costs that have already been budgeted for 2022.
Not bad. And then, point three, they said we're continuing to try and cut head office costs including moving to a new head office premises in the near term. In other words, they're getting out of that Collins Street Building, finally.
Jeremy: So you have three different items they're rapidly trying to cut costs. So, if your thesis was correct and these guys intend to pull up the moat and just fight to the death to get there, five, six hundred grand a year for the next 3-4 years, surely they'd be going the other way and say no, we're going to invest another 10 million drillings this well or that well. So it seems like they're maintaining some kind of posture. But at the same time, they're retreating somewhat from aggressive spinning.
So to your point, I think the situation is risky in the sense that it's a micro-cap, but I don't think it's all that risky. If they only commit to spending the six million dollars in 2022, which by the way, I think that number comes down further. Because as I said, cash on the balance sheet, 45 to 50 cents a share, plus the Woodside earn-out is, even at 50 cents on the dollar you're more than covered.
So this is still Raper Capital Special. It's like look after the downside, the upside will take care of itself. Yeah, I'm obviously trying to crystallize and catalyze that value return and get a huge excess return here. But you know, worst-case scenario, could I live with kind of a 75, 80 cents total return in six, nine months? Sure, I mean, that wouldn't be a great. I wouldn't put that up as a win, but it's not going to keep me in diamonds and furs, but I wouldn't be out on the street dancing for nickels.
Andrew: I would disagree with part of your thing, I think you could afford plenty of diamond and furs with that type of gross return. Let me tell one thing. I don't think this is essential to the thesis, but I do think it's worth discussion, and I think it's where a lot of people's first thoughts are. The reason I don't think it's to essential anymore, is I think this company is in play, right?
As you said, about a third of the companies turned over the stocks at 66, not 45 right now. But I'll go there anyway, STAM lobbed in their first bid at 45, right?
Andrew: And right now, there's one bidder. The one bidder is STAM at 45. So I don't think they're going up to 60, 65 or something. I don't know what they're doing. So just can you talk to me for a second? You're not a group. I don't know if you talk to them or not, but I know you're not a group with STAM. But can you just talk to me for a second about what you think STAM's going to do or thinking here?
Jeremy: Sure. So, as I said, STAM is a long-short value-oriented investment fund in Sydney. As you said, 45 cent bid, it's almost impossible not to make a great return right? There are no doubt very happy to take the whole thing down or just control of the company at that level. They see what I see it. It's simple.
Having said all that, I think they must have been realistic and thought, well, we may not get control. We may not be able to get the whole thing. But at least we're going to highlight the value and encourage other like-minded investors to look at this thing, which is essentially what happened.
And this is essentially what they did in their last activist case. So I mean, you can look at this is all public information in Australia. They have a history of going around and bidding sometimes for control of deeply discounted securities. And they're not ending up getting control, but nevertheless either getting a few percent or getting the board to play balls essentially.
So there was a company called Kangaroo Island Timber that is now Kiland (KIL) on the Australian stock exchange.
Jeremy: That was one of the last one STAM did. You can look it up. They bid a dollar. I'm going from memory. So I don't know the exact numbers, but they bid at a somewhat of a premium to the extant stock price, I think it was a dollar-dollar five or something. They already own 20%, so they had a much larger shareholding and the 20-25 percent. They bid at a dollar-dollar five, which is still a huge discount to the asset.
But again a similar situation mismanaged entity, huge hard asset value, etc. They bid a dollar-dollar five. They didn't get many acceptances, maybe a couple of percent. They got up to 27, 28%. I'm not sure where. But thereafter, the board made their defense in a target statement. Say it rejected, said, we're worth $2 a share or whatever. And then, the next thing that the board did is they bought the quarter of the company in dollar 35. The stock today is like a dollar 40.
So sure, they didn't get their playbook across, in the sense they didn't get to buy the whole thing at a deep discount, but they nevertheless extracted a huge amount of value. Now, I don't know their current [unintelligible]... and has a stock come off since then. I was looking at it like a couple of weeks ago. So maybe it's lower, the market obviously been crushed.
Andrew: But no, I was just saying, that's beautiful stuff. It's wonderful to...
Jeremy: Yeah, I mean, so they want to motivate and encourage through a visible campaign. I'm sorry, they want to. I'm speculating what they want. I have no idea what they want. But it makes sense to open the tent to broaden the investment tent for those who see the value. Because ultimately, it's a voting game, right?
And so they have 5%. But if another 15, 20% join, then all of a sudden you're guaranteed to get at least one board seat by force or by voluntary measures. And at that point, at the very least, we can return a huge amount of that excess cash.
Andrew: So the company just published their response to the bid yesterday, two days ago, something like that. Where do we go from here?
Jeremy: Sure. This is a slightly more speculative, basically the bid. Okay. So I'll just give you the timeline. So STAM's bid will expire on March 14th. I assume it will be largely rejected given the stock price where it is. So thereafter, those shareholders who have an interest in this will have to make a decision. Do you form a group? Do not form a group? Do you get your boards slate together? What do you do, call an EGM? Or do you wait for the AGM?
So, the Annual General Meeting (AGM) last year was in June. I assumed it would be it's similar timing today. There is one important detail I forgot to mention during the lead-up, which is very important in particular to this case. In Australia, there's a rule called the two-strike rule, which is a very interesting rule. If the remuneration policy gets at least 25% votes against...
Andrew: Just for our domestic listeners, remuneration, that's a big word.
Andrew: That's the Say-on-Pay Votes in Australia.
Jeremy: The Say-on-Pay Votes. If you get at least 25% against, it's deemed a strike. So, for example, you have the Say-on-Pay Vote, once a year at the AGM. If you get 25% against one year, that's strike one. Then, the next one rolls around. If you get another 25% against, that's strike two. That automatically forces what's called a spill vote? Where every director, not the MD but every director is automatically put up for re-election at a new vote.
So because FAR Management has been so historically bad, they did get that first strike last year. Meaning at the AGM this year, it's almost guaranteed. They will get a similar strike, meaning, if we go to the AGM, there will most likely be a spilt vote. Now, that means they'll be another vote sometime later, I think it's 60 or 90 days later, where all the directors have to be put up for re-election again.
And to be honest, you need 50%, right? So they may get the 50%. But it's my view that once there is a spill vote, once that remuneration policy gets that second strike, that in itself is a huge catalyst for board renewal. And obviously, the new members on the board, even though we were elected last year, they're not up for renewal but in a spill that they would be put up for renewal. So the managing director would not be at risk. I mistakenly thought the managing director would be up for a new role as well. It's not just the director but the two new directors would.
And so if they don't get the necessary votes, then of course, at that time, someone like me would likely proposed a new slate and those directors would obviously do what I suggested in my platform. And so, now that's a bit more of an extended process I think than an EGM. And any shareholder who owns 5% or group can call an EGM at which they can propose these resolutions to similar effect.
Now, you have to give 21 days notice. And then, directors have I believe it's 90 days to call an EGM. So, if you think about the timeline STAM bid's expires on March 14th. Thereafter, I imagine I will have conversations with a wide variety of shareholders and the company. Thereafter, you may or may not see an EGM resolution or we may wait till June go to the AGM.
But basically, within six months, I imagine this will be resolved one way or another. It's how I would put it. This isn't a 2 or 3 year trait. Within six months, one way or another, we will either have the board we have or a new board and a new MD or we won't. And we will know what's going to happen.
So in terms of cash burn at the company short 2022, you're going to continue to burn somewhere between, they said, six plus million dollars of cash out this year. I think it'll be lower than that. But yeah, you might have multi-million dollar cash out this year, but 2023 sure, the only other real liabilities on the balance sheet at least liabilities related to the office exit, which I believe were included largely in the 6 million.
And then drilling licenses and requirements which were running at a million a quarter.
But essentially, the thing about drilling license is if you are willing to bite the bullet and say we won't get anything back and just give up your rights to drill, you can walk away free and clear.
Maybe you have to pay some of the contractors a bit. But if you give up your rights, you don't have to put any more money in. My point is we do much better off getting a guaranteed dollar 25, dollar 30 back through a creative capital usage, then trying to drill for something that may or may not be there and we don't have the resources for.
So my kind of base or upside case scenario, I think the based case scenario is we're sitting here 12 months from today with a dollar 30 of value in our pockets, largely derived from a huge tender at a creative level. And Woodside cutting us to check early, which is in their best interest as well.
Andrew: Okay, I think we've covered a lot here. It's late, my time. I'm going to get ready to go to bed in a second. But I want to ask two questions. First, FAR, I think we pretty much-covered everything. But is there any point you wish we could hit or anything we should have a little harder?
Jeremy: I think that's basically it. I mean, I would only highlight, it is a small-cap company and not the most. I mean, it's liquid now, but it's often not the most liquid security. But in terms of actual...
Andrew: But it is at the most, like with as someone who tried to buy a couple of shares the other day, it took some work and I'd have this overnights and Australian [unintelligible] something. It's not easy.
Jeremy: Well, the thing is it was trading very aggressively in 50, 60 cents of range. It was trading a few million dollars a day, but it's kind of dried up around 65 cents, which makes sense.
Andrew: Well the 50, 60 cents ranges, the range I wanted to pay Jeremy.
Jeremy: You snooze, you lose mate. Got to wake up and trade local time.
Andrew: I know.
Jeremy: But look, who knows you might get another chance. I think we covered everything. I think we should probably do an update at some point in the next. I don't know, three months, four months from today. We should have a good idea of where we stand.
Andrew: Well, my second question was I think every time I have you on, we say we're going to do just a run down and just talk lots of events stocks and stuff. But again, it's running late. So I don't know if we're going to do that, but maybe we'll do the three-month update and do that. But anything else on your radar you want to chat about in terms of event land[?]?
Jeremy: Dude, I mean, I've got another 10 minutes if you do. But if you want to, it's getting late, right? So you want to call it a day.
Andrew: We will try for 10 minutes. I'll try to eyes open for 10 more minutes.
Jeremy: All right. Well, I think there are a few questions on Twitter about Last minute, European Travel Stock.
Andrew: Oh, I know. Well, yep. I know well because you're the one who told me to do it. Yes, I've told you. Go ahead.
Jeremy: Yeah. As you can say, this is interesting. I mean, look, you have people fighting over themselves to pay mid-teens[?] and multiple of US OTAs. Wherever booking at Expedia trade and like in the last 12 months, we've seen a pretty aggressive local recovery in the US and everyone's buildup on the leisure travel return trade post-Covid.
But you know, Europe is essentially 12 months, 15 months, maybe more, but maybe not that. Twelve months behind where the US was just given the slower vaccine roll out in the more fragmentation of the market and you have looked lastminute.com is a Swiss listed smallishcat security, it's about a 500 million market cap.
In trading and I think four and a half times even EBITDA, post covid EBITDA. And they literally just came out in therefore, Q[?] report and said, it's okay. So, it's just to give a few elements of context. I don't have time to go into all of them. But essentially, they focus on packages. So not pure of Vanilla flights but packages, so flight plus Hotel bundled together. That's the core of their offering.
So they're much more akin to some business like Thomas Cook that went defunct or TUI, a big German listed operator, or even something like On the Beach, which is a UK Focus travel provider. Then they are to a pure OTA with has a much higher flight exposure like booking.
Anyway, they came out and said, we're seeing massive demand in February. Essentially, despite Omicron January was a very good month, February, a huge demand running 20% above pre-Covid level...
Andrew: So Jeremy, "they" is last minute or "they" is booking?
Jeremy: "They" is last minute.
Andrew: When they say that, I didn't see them say that[?].
Jeremy: Yeah, it was 19% above run rate. To be clear, in February. So not in the reported numbers before Q[?], but in recent weeks we're seeing 19% above run rate. Pre-covid, February, whatever it was the demand for packages.
And so, I mean, there are a few threads to pull out here. I guess those threads I like to pull out into the easiest to quantify and that is the cost-out opportunity. Right? So basically during covid, a lot of businesses did this. They went through and deracinated the cost structure of their business.
So, if booking levels GTV, so Gross Travel Value, basically, bookings get back to 2019 levels. I think instead of making 50, 60 million of EBITDA, I think they'd be making 80 and 90 million of EBITDA, right just there.
Then you have this structural move away from single flight bookings to more curated travel, right? So there's a structural move towards packages. People want to get everything buttoned up before they travel now.
Andrew: Is there a share[?] that move to that?
Jeremy: They've been telling about it. The numbers seem to see, its very early in Europe, but a lot of providers have been talking about. TUI mentioned that aggressively. Last minute mentioned it a lot. It seems like there's a bit more interest towards it.
And in the third angle is strategic interest. This is obviously, special situations guy like me. This is where I really get out of bed excited. Is booking.com bought another European travel player Etraveli for a huge multiple of what turned out to be a loss-making business. I thought it was a profitable business, but they paid it a billion-plus for a business.
It's in a vertical essentially meta and flight oriented, but they wanted to integrate their offerings in Europe and then booking on their recent calls, said look, we could have competed and built the technology ourselves. But in Europe, it's quite complex given all the different markets.
Andrew: And that's important because, correct me if I'm wrong. But last minute does bookings. If you're on the booking website and you look for a package in Europe, last minute is the technology behind that.
Jeremy: That's right.
Andrew: The same rationale would play out.
Jeremy: Yes. That's true. Slightly more nuanced in the booking does white label lastminute.com dynamic package offering, meaning a package of this not like seven days from Sunday to Sunday, but customized by the user. So, okay, I want to leave on a Wednesday, come back on a Tuesday.
And I want to fly Ryanair. So a customizable package called a dynamic package. That technology was developed and licensed by a last minute, not just to booking but to a number of other Hotel operators and sites in Europe as well.
But yes, that's a good strong validation for the technology. And it's essentially what booking was doing with Etraveli. They were a supplier to booking as well, and then they got rolled up for the synergies.
And so, I think there are just multiple ways to win either Europe reopens, it's 100% Leisure Travel. Leisure travel comes back, roaring. Everyone's talking about this thing trades on a very low multiple.
Two, booking tries to roll it up because they need the technology. They don't want to build it themselves. The market access 13 different markets that that last-minute is licensed in. All the local language support the last minute spent many years developing.
And three, the ownership structure of the business would encourage a sale because one of the founders recently sold down to essentially, a Private Equity buyer. Private Equity is increasingly dominating the float. I think they own about 30, maybe even 40% of the look-through and [unintelligible].
Andrew: They were trying to sell before covid. If I remember correctly, weren't they?
Jeremy: They almost sold the business pre-covid at a level "much higher than the extant stock price". And the stock of that time was in the mid 40s. Yeah, I mean, I can't see how this trades it four or 41/2 of EBITDA even if it doesn't get taken out in 2022.
Andrew: The other thing that's interesting, I'm not involved here currently, but I did a decent bit of work on it when you first mentioned it to me. If you go through, I don't think they published the 2021 financials, either 2020 financials or the 2021 semi-annual financials, I can't remember.
If you look in the footnotes, they give you their goodwill and how they model and they give you the DCF or how they get their goodwill, which is them giving you their internal projections for what the business is going to do.
And it's a lot harder than what the current stock price has implied which internal projections, whatever. But I hadn't seen anyone, talk about them and my history has been when a company puts into a financial filing future projections that have been run by auditors. Because again that's in the footnotes to the auditors that to bless that, it tends to be pretty interesting if it's hugely diversion from what the stock market has.
Jeremy: Totally. That was a great catch. I should have mentioned that. And then, the other thing that's more obvious, unless observant person like myself, is that the executive comp package is two-thirds of it is struck at 60 francs a share of stocks at 40.
Now that these guys are getting paid unless the stock gets opportunity above 60 Euros, that's 50% upside right there. I mean, I kind of targeted some lower multiple, nevertheless, I think achievable multiple for a potential transaction with booking like a high single-digit multiple of neuron right earnings that get you a mid-70s stock price, 80 francs in stock price.
So it's pretty juicy, I think. Anyway, it's late. So I want to let you get to bed, but that's that's the one that's really on my radar. That's one of my bigger positions at the moment[?].
Andrew: Perfect, pretty well. Hey, Jeremy, in a couple of months we'll have to do is catch up on farm. We're going to have to do the long awaited, you and I just go through 10 different event names. And I think it's a really interesting time for events right now.
I posted something the other day just like, not that I've never, but, interestingly, you and I talked MoneyGram offline before but I just use the MoneyGram, for example because...
Jeremy: Yeah, pretty cool.
Andrew: Thank you. I wish I had been a lot bigger but I just use the example. Like Reuters reports bid at 10-50 or whatever. Three bidders come in bids at 10[?] and the stock was at nine dollars for three weeks. And I just kept looking at me like what's going on and then a deal came. But we've seen several those Tegna the other day, there was one bid of 23. There is one bid at 24.
Stock closes last week at 20-50. And they announced a deal this week at 24. And I know these aren't like screaming grand slams, Jeremy Raper buy something for 40 cents and liquidates it for a dollar 20. But like there's interesting and I'm seeing a lot of those and I know some of those fit into your wheelhouse. So we're going to have to do that.
Jeremy Raper, I'm going to include a link to his Twitter. So look, if you're an Australian shareholder of FAR and you're just looking to swap notes, looking stock, clicking to its smarter[?]. Please reach out to Jeremy.
I do not empty this board if they try to stop you from doing what's rational here because we saw at Hunter Douglas, you'll probably get what you want. But thanks for coming over Jeremy. We'll chat soon.
Jeremy: Thanks, man. Thanks for having me. I appreciate it. Speak soon.
Andrew: Bye, buddy.